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The difference in the
impact of the crisis in
different areas of the world
Who can win and who can lose?
This question has not one single answer. It is time to prospect,
to weigh risks for the future and act. One can learn from diversity
and adversity, in a world that is far from uniformity, where new
agglomeration trends become evident as they come together
with the increasingly complex role of globalisation and
international trade, which have acquired a major relevance with
recent events; a world with a scenario of increasing vertical
specialisation of tasks, where notable growth has occurred and
inequality has increased, where the country gap reveals the role
of public policies; a world where the current crisis has a different
impact based on activity, population segment and country, and
will have differing effects on its competitiveness. The article
presents these different impacts in a world and at a time in which
there are also opportunities.
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Many questions like this one, in a moment like
this, with high levels of uncertainty, do not
have one single answer for economists nor for
the not so much economists. And for those of
us who also do prospecting usually comes the
fact that the future is not written and depends
on individual and collective action on the
ground that is taken now but determines the
future in the short and long term. Any decision
– individual, corporate, social or political –
comes along with a vision of the future,
whether right or wrong, either immediate or
not so immediate. What seems to be beyond
any doubt is that the current crisis, though
comparable to other periods, also has some dis-
tinctive features making it different. In any case,
it is time to prospect, weigh risks for the future,
act and get prepared with contingency plans.
In times of crisis it is time to prospect,
weigh risks for the future and act.
In a world far from uniformity, in which new
agglomeration trends become evident, where
given activities and talent, creativity, innovation,
technology and capital (despite its volatility)
concentrate on certain areas and countries,
we can learn from diversity and adversity. These
new trends come together with the increasingly
complex role of globalisation and international
trade in a balance between dispersion and con-
centration forces (OME, ACC1Ó, 2008), which
have been modified by a knowledge-based
economy and progress of ICT. Globalisation and
international trade have grown in relevance as
the financial crisis that started in the United
States spread to emerging economies, which
are now experiencing a strong slowdown in
their average growth (International Monetary
Fund, IMF, 2009).
We are in a world scenario with increasing vertical
specialisation of tasks, in which trade of goods
is being replaced by trade of tasks (OME,
COPCA, 2007). In the last decades, this world
has been experiencing strong growth, the more
so in so-called emerging economies where
inequalities also have increased.
The OECD has stated a growth of inequality
and poverty in two thirds of countries in the
last five years. The Gini coefficient has
increased by two points in the last twenty
years. It also points out that the degree of
affection and the causes leading to such
inequalities are explained by numerous factors
of several kinds, from different use of techno-
logical capacities to diverse sociopolitical
change. It points out that the current level of
expenditure in social policies is higher than in
the past due to ageing population in developed
countries, but it also states that the redistribu-
tion effect of public expenditure
– from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s –
caused a slowdown in the increase of poverty,
and  positive effects of this expenditure had less
effect on the poorest, as it did in the following
decade. The relevance of the role of public
 policies in the different evolution of countries
is also explained (OECD, 2008).
We are in a world scenario with
increasing vertical specialisation of
tasks, in which trade of goods is being
replaced by trade of tasks.
All this indicates that the current recession can
have a very different impact according to the
activity, population segment, country and area
concerned. In fact, in May 2008, Stephan
Garelli, from the Institute of Management
Development, (IMD), pointed out that the cur-
rent crisis could affect the leading position
of the United States in the competitiveness
ranking published by the organisation, stating
that no country is immune to collapse, no matter
its competitive position. Garelli quoted
 Benjamin Franklin’s words: «Even a small hole
can sink a big ship.»
It has also been shown that emerging
economies have not been able to escape from
recession, which is deeper and larger than
expected in developed economies, as opposed
to what some analysis said in relation with
decoupling (IMD, 2009).
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With respect to the degree of interdependence
between economies, the study by Kose, Otrok
and Prasad (2008), commented in the last
Informe Anual de l’Observatori de Mercats Exteriors
(Observatory of Foreign Markets Annual Report)
is worth mentioning. The authors’ conclusion is
that integration mechanisms and forces interact
with each other at both global and regional level.
The current recession can have a
very different impact according to
the activity, population segment,
country and area concerned.
At the same time, the authors point out
that the current recession can have distinct
effects on the pace, the impact and long-term
competitiveness of countries according to
 public and private, individual and collective
response.
Different impact in different
countries
Countries depending on exports such as Japan,
Germany, South Korea and China also suffer
from recession in global demand and need to
turn to the domestic market. Emerging countries
like China, Brazil and India have not been left
untouched by the recession in Europe and the
United States.
All countries are undergoing credit restriction. Also
emerging economies depending on foreign
 capital (some Central and Eastern European
countries, the Baltic states, Turkey and some
in Central Asia) will be vulnerable.
The United Kingdom is especially vulnerable
due to high family debt – 150% of available
income – one of the highest in the developed
world. It is also one of the countries most
dependent on the finance sector, which has
contributed to 25% of its growth in the last five
years and amounts to more than one fifth of
employment, compared to 6% of jobs in the
United States.
Countries depending on exports
also suffer from recession in
global demand and need to turn to
the domestic market. Those with a
surplus and the Persian Gulf countries
may have smaller reserves due to the
rescue of banks and companies.
Public debt in Japan amounts to more than
170% of its GDP, in Italy it is more than 100%
and Greece is not lagging much behind. These
countries might soon be limited in their mone-
tary and taxation possibilities.
Countries with a surplus like China, Russia
and the Persian Gulf countries may have
smaller reserves due to the rescue of banks
and companies. They might take less damage
from the crisis than those that did not invest
enough in their future competitiveness,
 considering investment as implying more eco-
nomic diversity in social infrastructure, especially
education, institutional quality and sustainable
development.
Competitiveness and
resilience to crisis in
different countries
Globalisation, especially financial one, has
reached unprecedented features. Although it is
true that from a historic perspective, globalisation
and setbacks due to social distress and protec-
tionism have been around for a long time at the
current level and in possible scenarios that are
being discussed now, some pieces of analysis
also point towards several globalisation waves
with distinctive features. The globalisation
process has played a relevant role in distributing
economic activity, tasks and the generation of
new agglomeration trends involving change
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related to income and labour, and it has also
had an influence on the different positions of
countries in a heterogeneous world.
It is currently obvious that a cooperation and
commitment scheme between emerging
and advanced countries to stimulate the econ-
omy and avoid protectionism is the way to go
for the benefit of all. Despite present uncertainty,
some countries can find measures to reach more
sustainable competitiveness in the long term.
In this respect, it is interesting to compare the
IMD 2007-08 competitiveness ranking and
that of resilience of different countries to
change of economic cycle from the same
source, published one year later in its competi-
tiveness report as shown on Chart 1 (C 2007
refers to the competitiveness ranking and R
2008-2009 to that of resilience) and on Graph 1.
Among countries with a far worse position in
the resilience than the competitiveness ranking
are developed ones: the United States (1st in
competitiveness and 21st in resilience to
change of economic cycle), France (25th and
41st, respectively), Ireland (12th and 25th),
Spain (39th and 45th) and Japan (22nd and
32nd).
Contrarily, among countries featuring the
biggest opposite difference between both
 rankings are some developing ones. This is
the case of Brazil, taking the 43rd position in the
competitiveness ranking but ranging 9th in
resilience to change of economic cycle, as well
as India (29th and 8th, respectively), Turkey
(48th and 31st) and Indonesia (51st and 38th).
Also countries like Denmark, Sweden, Norway
and Finland are well positioned in both rankings.
Unequal risks and scenarios
for different countries and
economic areas
It is interesting to note that the March 2009
Economist Intelligence Unit identified three
macroeconomic scenarios for the evolution of
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Graph 1. Comparison between the competitiveness and the resilience ranking
Source: OME, based on IMD data
Among countries with a far worse position in the resilience than in the competitiveness ranking are
developed ones like the US, France, Ireland, Spain and Japan.
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the crisis and risk assessment. The first, at an
estimate likeliness of 60%, is that in which
governmental stimuli are able to stabilise
the global financial system by 2010 and restore
economic growth in countries leading the
developed world at a lower level than in recent
years.
A second scenario – at a 30% probability rate
– are countries with big associated risks and
likeliness of deflation and depression in the
OECD countries. In this scenario, economic
stimuli are not enough and the bigger role
of governments in rescuing banks and
attempting to stimulate domestic demand
leads to protectionist pressure and hampers
globalisation.
In this scenario, as has been mentioned earlier,
it is not only indebted economies that are
vulnerable1 but also those having a seemingly
better position – based on savings rate, trade
and current account surplus – can get in seri-
ous trouble if global demand and trade col-
lapse.2 And in the developed world, the
eurozone can be struck harder by limitations
of monetary policy in some countries, antici-
pating a stronger impact on those with a
weaker position regarding competitiveness
and whose sustainability of its public finance
is dubious.
The Economist also insists on interdependence
of emerging markets, which it classifies
according to three types based on their
 vulnerability:
Countries where growth has been driven by
credit expansion and appreciation of asset prices,
i.e. Central and Eastern European countries
with a high current account deficit while
struggling with high foreign debt (Hungary,
Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania).
Countries with a strong link to global
growth (most Asian countries) depending
on growth of their exports, for which a protec-
tionist scenario can lead to export decline in the
medium term, with strong effects on the sol-
vency of companies and banks. In such a
 protectionist scenario, the role of China in
the recovery of the world economy is at stake.
Aggressive measures by China to stimulate
private consumption by improving health and
social protection may be insufficient and
not make up for the decline in exports. Imbal-
ance may persist in the country and affect the
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Brazil
India
Chile
Turkey
Israel
Indonesia
Argentina
Czech Rep.
South Africa
Singapore
Canada
Japan
Hong Kong
Spain
Ireland
France
Hungary
United States
43
29
26
48
20
51
52
28
53
2
8
22
3
33
12
25
38
1
9
8
7
31
4
38
39
17
44
11
18
32
15
45
25
41
54
21
34
21
19
17
16
13
13
11
9
-9
-10
-10
-12
-12
-13
-16
-16
-20
Competi-
tiveness
(2007)
Resilience
(2008-
2009)
VariationCountry
Table 1. Comparison between
competitiveness and resilience ranking
Source: OME, based on IMD data
The countries featuring the biggest difference
between low competitiveness and high resilience
ranking are developing ones.
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global economy. The increase of bank credits
as a reaction to governmental pressure may
translate in inefficient capital distribution
and create a bigger excess capacity and
low return on investment that eventually
may require support from the government to
restore capital adequacy.
Countries dependent on commodities. They
include such in Latin America, the Middle
East, Africa and Russia, which are struggling
with price falls3 as a reaction to persistent
decline in global demand. Some countries
may undergo financial restrictions, such as the
economies managed more carefully that
invested in productive capacity. Sovereign
wealth funds will become less important as
their value is persistently declining.
Finally, a strong decline in economic activity
according to the third alternative risk
scenario4 may cause an increase of the risk of
social distress and, as Graph 2 shows, a different
degree of vulnerability of social and political
stability in those countries.5
A time for opportunities to
improve competitiveness
As can be inferred from this article, given
the current situation, some stakeholders
could lose or win more than others and have
a different impact on the immediate future as
well as in the longer term, based on the
individual and collective action they take
now. In situations as the present one, people
and companies resort to the most economi-
cal alternatives. Low-cost competitors are
gaining ground in many industries while
others are losing. Also new competitors
appear with different, innovative business
models allowing lower costs and prices.
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Graph 2. Risk of social and political instability
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit.
A strong decline in economic activity may cause an increase of the risk of social distress.
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Some companies also take advantage of sit-
uations like the present one to launch new
products: it is easier and more economical to
draw the attention of the customer when com-
petitors are forced to cut costs and customers
are under strong pressure, so they may be
more open towards trying new products,
especially if they are cost-saving. Hence a
crisis can also be a time for opportunities to
improve competitiveness.
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Notes
1. United States, United Kingdom, Spain and Ireland.
2. Germany, Japan and China.
3. The oil price is decreasing $20 a barrel.
4. Estimated to be likely at a 10%.
5. The resulting indicator has a scale going from 0 (non-vulnerability) to 10 (highest vulnerability). It has two components measuring
vulnerability itself, with indicators such as inequality level, history of political instability, corruption, ethnical fragmentation, trust in in-
stitutions, situation of minorities, level of social policies or political systems. The other component measures economic malfunction,
with indicators such as income growth, unemployment or living standard.
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